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1. Introduction
The aim of this paper is to describe the different types and develop- 
ment of transaction costs (for a definition, see below) in formerly cen- 
trally planned economies (Soviet-Type Economies2 — STEs). Western- 
-Type Economies (WTEs, i.e. capitalist economies) have managed to 
lower marginal transaction costs, which has stimulated economic devel- 
opment. STEs, on the other hand, failed to adjust their institutions so 
that the phase of fast economic growth after the Second World War was 
followed by a declining speed of further economic development, ulti- 
mately leading to economic stagnation. Another ąuestion addressed is 
what were the conseąuences of the high transaction costs under the old 
system for the economic development in the transition period in Poland.
It will be argued that in an STE like Poland, with the USSR as power 
centre (stakeholder) and the communist party being the most important 
institution, transaction costs increased so much that reforms were inevi- 
table at the beginning of the 1980s. However, as these reforms did not 
take place transaction costs increased even morę during the 1980s, caus- 
ing further economic stagnation, thereby making radical institutional
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change even morę necessary.3 In 1989 the economic system in Poland 
started to change from, roughly speaking, an STE into a WTE, which led 
to a reform of several existing STE-type institutions. Obviously, this in- 
stitutional change reduced or even removed certain transaction costs re- 
lated to the old system. In addition the transition process as such also 
resulted in new types of transaction costs.
3Although social and political factors in a strict sense are of great importance for ex- 
plaining the collapse of the Soviet-Type Economy, the focus of this article is inereasing 
transaction cost creating the conditions for institutional change.
4 Institutions are “the rules of the gamę in a society, being constraints devised by hu- 
man beings which shape human interactions.” [North, 1990, p. 3] Institutions can be di- 
vided in formal (e.g. the system of property rights, laws, government regulations) and in- 
formal institutions (e.g. conventions, norms of behaviour, and culture — in other words, 
unwritten rules of the gamę).
An important ąuestion now is to what extent the transition process in 
Poland with its institutional change has created new transaction costs 
that could slow down economic activity. An additional ąuestion is to 
what extent incentives were created for people to undertake economic 
activity in the new situation. Existing state-owned enterprises were dif- 
ficult to reform, and faced high market transaction costs. There were 
strong incentives for smali business to develop due to the emergence of 
new markets and a lack of regulations. The reason for addressing these 
ąuestions in this paper is that sińce 1993 the Polish economy has been 
growing again after about three years of strong economic decline. 
Whether the economy will be able to follow this path of growth (5-6% in- 
crease in GDP per year) depends to a large extent on the existence of an 
institutional environment which lowers transaction costs and creates in- 
centives for economic activity and technical efficiency.
2. Planning transaction costs
versus market transaction costs
Following Furubotn and Richter [1997], three different types of trans­
action costs can be distinguished: market transaction costs, managerial 
transaction costs, and political transaction costs. Transaction costs arise 
because there is no complete Information and people are imperfect (they 
make mistakes and do not know everything). Barzel [1989, p. 2] defines 
transaction costs as “the costs associated with the transfer, capture, and 
protection of rights.” According to Furubotn and Richter [1997, p. 43] 
“transaction costs embrace... the costs of establishing, maintaining, or 
changing a system’s basie institutional framework.”4 Each of the three
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types of transaction costs distinguished by these authors can be subdi- 
vided into ‘fixed’ and ‘variable’ transaction costs. ‘Fixed’ transaction 
costs are “the specific investments madę in setting up institutional ar- 
rangements”5 and ‘variable’ transaction costs are the costs “that depend 
on the number or volume of transactions.” For the purpose of this paper, 
the focus will be on market and managerial transaction costs.
5 The institutional environment provides the basie rules of the gamę in a society con- 
sisting of formal and informal rules. This institutional environment constrains govern- 
ment and market actors to make public and private institutional arrangements (e.g. 
contracts, firms, labour unions) - organisation forms within which transactions are 
co-ordinated and executed [Groenewegen et. al., 1997, p. 57],
Market transaction costs are related to using the market, and like any 
type of transaction costs consist of search, negotiation, and control costs. 
Search cost are basically the costs of obtaining information. Examples 
are: searching for buyers and sellers, information about their behaviour, 
laws and regulations, what is written in a contract and what is meant by 
it, etc. Negotiation costs are the costs connected with concluding a con­
tract. If, for example, a representative of a firm wants to conclude a con­
tract with another firm, he has to negotiate with this other firm as well 
as with the responsible people within his own firm. Besides, the neces- 
sary bureaucracy and paperwork are also included in these costs. 
Finally, control costs concern monitoring and enforcing the fulfilment of 
the contract. When, for example, a firm sells some goods and ships them 
with a transport company, there are costs connected with checking 
whether the transport company does its job properly, whether they pay, 
checking if there are damages due to non-fulfilment of the contract, the 
compensation of those damages, etc. Institutions that can lower those 
transaction costs are, for example, consultants, a developed market 
structure with self-enforcing rules, a developed legał system, and so on.
Furubotn and Richter [1997, p. 46] define ‘fixed’ managerial transaction 
costs as costs connected with the “creation, use and change of an organi- 
zation” and ‘variable’ managerial transaction costs as the costs of manag- 
ing, information Processing, communication and supervision in a com­
pany. In other words, the ‘variable’ transaction costs concern the costs of 
“running an organization” which can be divided into (i) information costs 
and (ii) what Williamson [1985, p. 1] calls “costs associated with the phys- 
ical transfer of goods and services across a separable interface.”
With respect to a centrally planned economy, the main costs of plan- 
ning are information costs which concern the costs of decision-making 
(collecting and processing information, plan bargaining, etc.), the control 
costs of monitoring the execution of orders, agency costs, the costs of in-
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formation management, etc. The STE can be considered as one big com­
pany, although there are some significant differences in the institutional 
environment and the incentive structure as compared with a large capi- 
talist company. Although both use bureaucratic co-ordination to solve 
the allocation problem - as opposed to market co-ordination - in a capi- 
talist firm the owner (owners) can be pointed out, to whom managers are 
responsible and whose earnings are directly influenced by the manager’s 
behaviour, while the company operates within a morę or less competitive 
market environment. In a socialist bureaucracy there is no direct owner 
whose earnings are influenced directly by the manager’s behaviour, 
while each bureaucratic “head has another head over him or her.” The 
motivation of the ultimate leader for decision-making are political rather 
than monetary [Kornai, 1992, p. 124], while the existence of a market is 
morę and morę limited in the process of “perfecting” the socialist 
planned economy.
The transaction costs in an STE are strongly connected with the pro­
cess of direct bureaucratic control of the economy. “This embraces the 
elaboration of plans with the force of commands and the administrative 
compulsion to implement them, the management based on the com­
mands, and the practice of superior organization intervening regularly 
in every detail of the production and allocation process and day-to-day 
running of the subordinate organization.” [Kornai, 1992, p. 117] Pejovich 
[1995, p. 146] argues that the lack of market signals (i.e. indicators of 
real scarcity, like market price) makes the transaction costs of resource 
allocation higher in a planned economy than in a market economy.6 
Here transaction costs concern the process of decision-making about who 
should do what, the plan preparation, and the control of the correctness 
of Information provided by the subordinates in the hierarchy. Those sub- 
ordinates have an interest in maintaining and enhancing the control 
costs connected with the monitoring of their performance, an argument 
that supports the statement that the transaction costs of plan-bar- 
gaining increased through time (discussed in Section 4). Transaction 
costs specific for an STE are the resources needed for enforcing the plan, 
preparing the plan, maintaining and protecting the rules of the gamę 
(e.g. armed forces, security forces), and the control costs of preventing
6 In a market economy transaction costs are spread among the population. In case of 
decreasing economies of scalę concerning transaction costs, there is a limit on the amount 
of transactions an organisation can do without increasing the marginal transaction costs 
too much. This means that, other things eąual, the higher marginal transaction costs for 
the planner, the lower amount of transactions compared with a morę de-centralised sys­
tem of economic organisation.
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managers of firms and agents lower in the hierarchy (subordinates) to 
falsify Information for their superiors.
In the STE market transaction costs were very Iow for firms due to 
the existence of shortages. Almost whatever was produced, there was 
a demand for it. This, on the other hand, led to high transaction costs for 
consumers who had to queue.7 Shortages also created an informal 
(black) market which was connected with high transaction costs (espe- 
cially search costs). Opposed to the so-called shortage economy where de­
mand is not constrained by the budget of consumers and producers but 
by supply, the WTEs are rather demand-constrained economies where 
the budgets of the consumers and producers determine how many goods 
are allocated. In the WTE suppliers have to compete for customers caus- 
ing search costs for them. Another example of the influence of different 
institutional environment on transaction costs is the struggle for cus­
tomers which causes institutional arrangements like providing credits 
and loans to come into existence. In the 1970s in Poland some goods like 
cars were delivered on a pre-payment base. This lowers the possibility 
for post-contractual opportunistic behaviour8 (e.g. cheating by not pay- 
ing). The system of selling with payments afterwards increases the 
amount of transactions, but also increases the possibilities for opportu: 
nistic behaviour, which leads to an increase in transaction costs (control 
costs). Total transaction costs can increase, but marginal and average 
transaction costs per unit of product sold can decrease when, for exam- 
ple, opportunistic behaviour only appears on a smali scalę. The height of 
the marginal transaction costs (and the influence on economic activity) 
depends on the extent to which there are institutions that lower in- 
centives for opportunistic behaviour and facilitate the enforcement of 
contr acts.
7 In a survey among 418 Poles older than 15 years carried out by the author at the be- 
ginning of 1999, the people who mentioned to have queued before 1989 (about 95% of the 
sample) reported to have queued morę than 7 hours on average per week (men on average 
about 6 hours, women about 8 hours).
8 “Morał hazard is a problem of ‘postcontractual opportunism’, in that the presence of 
some unobservable (unverifiable) action provides people with an opportunity to cheat af- 
ter the deal is signed.” It is the existence of private Information that creates possibilities 
for opportunistic behaviour. [Molho, 1997, p. 8],
3. Transaction Costs and Economic Development
Douglas North [1990, 1993] (following Adam Smith) considers an effi- 
cient solution of the co-ordination problem (the way in which in a society
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wishes are reconciled with scarce resources) as the most important fac- 
tor of growth of welfare. The process can be described as follows.
- In the long run the advantage of further division of labour, gains from 
trade, and technical innovation leads to increasing returns to scalę.
- When the scalę of production increases (as well as the scope of the 
market ) the amount of complex transactions also increases, leading 
to increasing transaction costs and bigger individual uncertainty.
9
- When production is organised in a technically efficient way a large 
part of the wealth-maximising behaviour is used for improvement of 
the production techniques and minimisation of transaction costs.  
Pejovich [1995, pp. 88-90], using the example of the transaction sector, 
gives three major reasons why transaction costs in a growing economy 
increase: 1. the replacement of personal exchange (repeated dealings) by 
impersonal exchange, 2. Capital intensive production techniąues stimu- 
late growth in size of firms, leading to increasing managerial transaction 
costs, and 3. gains from trade can lead to conflicting interpretations 
about the rules of the gamę, the institutional arrangement, and the dis- 
tribution of income leading to increased spending on “defining and en- 
forcing the rules of the gamę.” [Pejovich, 1995, p. 90].
10
9 In the STE the task of the planner would increase. When the planner cannot solve the 
co-ordination problem efficiently, the size of the ‘informal market’ is likely to increase.
10 In the STE a large part of the wealth-maximising behaviour of consumers was used 
for arranging consumption goods, while producers were busy with bargaining for lower 
plan targets and morę inputs for assuring an ‘easy life’.
The first reason concerns the changes connected with economic growth 
that goes together with an expanding market. Suppose that in a tradi- 
tional society people only trade with other people they have known for 
a long time. In that case the costs of searching clients are quite Iow, and 
so are control costs. In case of repeated transactions in a traditional soci­
ety, the consequences of cheating (post-contractual opportunistic behav- 
iour) can be quite big, e.g. the cost of not paying can be being an outcast 
for the rest of your life (losing your good name). With an expanding mar­
ket due to division of labour and gains from trade this repeated trading 
is replaced by impersonal exchange - the morę the market expands, the 
longer the chain of unknown exchange partners.
The increase in the working of such an expanding markefs invisible 
hand is not a free ride. Search costs increase (searching clients and new 
markets), as well as negotiation costs (Information about reliability of a Cli­
ent, etc.) and control costs (if you do not know someone it is morę difficult 
to foresee if he, for example, does not cheat; also for the contract partner 
the incentive to cheat is greater when he does not know you and the ex-
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change is not going to be repeated). Institutional mechanisms are impor- 
tant for reducing market transaction costs. A market, for example, reduces 
the costs of searching clients, a reputation reduces control costs, an efficient 
legał system reduces enforcement costs (when that procedurę is too expen- 
sive, this leads to fewer transactions, however ‘informal enforcement ar- 
rangements’ can be cheaper and morę efficient, but morally objectionable).
The importance of transaction costs in economic growth can be de- 
scribed in a simple scheme: institutional framework facilitating eco­
nomic growth economic growth —> morę transactions -» initially 
higher (marginal) transaction costs -> the existing institutional environ- 
ment and arrangements are only fit to deal with a certain amount of 
transactions -> institutional change needed to lower (marginal) transac­
tion costs in order to facilitate trade and economic growth. However, in­
stitutional change is costly and is very often not in the interest of all 
parties in the economy.11
11Inefficient institutions can keep on existing because, for example, powerful groups 
obtain privileges and property rights that hamper economic growth [Groenewegen et. al., 
1997, p. 67], An example of this is the Communist Party and the institution of state-prop- 
erty in STEs. These two institutions were the fundaments of the classical socialist system 
with a high ideological value which was a reason to keep them (as well as because of 
self-interest of the nomenklatura), although they became a brake on economic growth.
Put differently, following North, a two-sided problem can be distin- 
guished:
1. The problem of a technically efficient set-up of the production (static 
and dynamie efficiency): this directs the searching behaviour of indi- 
viduals in such a way that they really aim for technical efficiency.
2. The problem of a socially efficient set-up of the production: when trans­
action costs decrease, technical economies of scalę are obtainable.
The idea is that the social organisation is set up in such a way, that 
static and dynamie efficiency are achieved approximately. Of course 
there will be space for strategie or opportunistic behaviour. Main point is 
not the transaction costs, but the cost of loss of technical efficiency. 
North [1993, p. 359] argues that when economic actors aim for technical 
efficiency, even when they have initially wrong models they will change 
this due to competition of the market.
Another ąuestion is what incentives under different market structures 
exist to lower transaction costs. The morę competition, the stronger the 
incentives to lower transaction costs. In a shortage economy the custom- 
ers will come anyway, while the market transaction costs for the firms/ 
planner are Iow. Here is a Iow incentive to lower the transaction costs of 
allocation. For a firm under market competition there is an incentive to
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reduce costs, also because the gains are felt directly. In other words, 
which institutional environment reduces transaction costs? Theoretically 
it is possible (practically morę difficult) to imagine an organisation where 
everyone aims at improving technical efficiency, but where the advan- 
tages immediately leak away in transaction costs.12 In other words, striv- 
ing for lowering transaction costs can lead to a design of efficient institu- 
tions, while high transaction costs can cause inefficient organisations for 
concluding transactions [Groenewegen, et. al., 1997, p. 67],
12However, it can be argued that this was morę or less the case with slavery. Suppose 
the owners of the slaves aim at technical efficiency, and distract value by paying the slave 
only a fraction of his marginal product (in order to survive). The slave has a lower incen- 
tive to produce efficiently than when he would earn the entire marginal product. The rela- 
tive advantage of slavery is reduced due to the existence of transaction costs, mainly due 
to different agency problems and specific problems connected with slavery. This concerns 
costs of controlling consumption behaviour that collides with productivity aims (e.g. alco- 
holism), costs of controlling if a slave is really ill and that he does not injure himself on 
purpose,. costs of preventing damaging productive assets on purpose, and control costs 
connected with preventing uprising. Although pain incentives may increase the productiv- 
ity of slave labour, control costs can wipe out any of these productive gains. [Eggerstsson, 
1990, pp. 204-5, and 208-9]
4. Transaction Costs of Planning
4.1. Problems of planning: incentives, 
plan-bargaining and Information
Increasing transaction costs and Iow adaptive efficiency in the STE 
first will be discussed with help of problems that Kornai [1992, 
pp. 117-8, 122-4, and 126-9] points out with respect to the centrally 
planned economy. He argues that the direct bureaucratic control (plan­
ning) of an economy is viable in the sense that it solves the allocation 
problem (what, how, and for whom to produce) in many important fields. 
However, the adaptive efficiency (i.e. institutions able to adapt to 
changes through time, and institutions giving incentives for gaining 
knowledge, introducing innovations, and solving problems and bottle- 
necks in society through time [see North, 1990, p. 80]) is very Iow. The 
system adapts very slowly to technological change, while technological 
development is slow due to a lack of incentives for initiative, entrepre- 
neurship, and innovation. In the former centrally planned economies 
technological change was rather exogenous (planned), while the men- 
tioned disincentives for individuals and firms and high transaction costs 
of adapting the plan to the introduction of new technologies were huge 
barriers for endogenous technological development. Part of adaptive effi-
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ciency is learning from mistakes [North, 1990, p. 81], which was a very 
weak point of the STE. The main problem of the STE was in the incen- 
tive structure, conflicts in interests between different strata of the econ- 
omy, and a huge Information problem (distortions in collection and 
utilisation).
- There was a high risk of taking initiative, being creative, and 
criticising upwards within the bureaucracy, implying high transaction 
costs of correcting mistakes, improving distorted Information, etc. 
“The character-forming and training effect, and the selection criteria 
of bureaucratic control, reinforce each other: servility and a heads- 
-down mentality prevail.”13
- High and increasing negotiation costs in the vertical bargaining pro- 
cess.  Although there were morę players, for simplicity it is assumed 
that there is a branch minister, a branch director, and a manager of 
a state owned enterprise. The minister provides the branch director 
with the annual plan, and the branch manager dis-aggregates it for 
firms (concerning production, materiał allocation, and manpower). 
This is a classical example of a problem with asymmetric Information 
(as explained in the generał ‘principal-agent framework’), where the 
person on the lowest level possesses most of the Information, giving 
incentives for opportunistic behaviour. The Information problem łies 
in the firm’s production capacities and its production function. An 
easy life is in the interest of the manager, giving him an interest in 
easy production plans and the availability of as much materials and 
labour as possible. This is a case of morał hazard where the manager 
distorts information by reporting less capacity and the need of morę 
materials and labour than is the case in reality. It pays off to bargain 
for a looser plan than proposed by the branch director. The drafter of 
the plan has two lines of defence: draft a plan morę ambitious than in 
‘normal’ cases and ‘plan in’ the level of input and output achieved the 
year before (‘ratchet effect’). This gives the manager an extra incentive 
to withhold performance and exactly achieve the plan (under- 
achievement would be punished). The branch director, interested in 
higher production and less use of materials of the state-owned enter-
14
13 An implication for the transition period of this informal institution that developed 
during socialism is that entrepreneurship as a mentality/culture is something that has to 
be developed. The formal rules change much faster than informal rules, however how fast 
a culture of initiative and self-responsibility is created depends on the incentives given by 
the changing formal rules and how strong ideology/culture enhances or hampers such 
a development.
14 In a market economy bargaining between suppliers and demanders takes place on 
a horizontal level. In hierarchies bargaining takes place on a vertical level.
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prise, faces a similar role as the manager when bargaining with the 
ministry. It is in his interest to keep some ‘capacity reserve’ and bar- 
gain for a looser plan. This makes the bargaining position of the 
branch director with the manager weaker, because the manager is his 
‘natural partner’ when dealing with the highest level of the bureau- 
cracy. The consequence is that the stream of information from the bot- 
tom to the top is methodically distorted. This means that when the 
bargaining process in an STE took definite shape, planners had to 
deal with distorted information, and as a consequence they had morę 
and morę to guess. Plans based on estimates rather than reliable in­
formation are morę likely to cause distortions. The moment there are 
morę products to be planned and the bargaining chain becomes longer, 
other things equal, the chance of distortion also becomes bigger. Im- 
provisation rather that planning is likely to become practice.
- The major objective of the leading institute of an STE, the Communist 
Party, was rapid economic growth with an emphasise on quantity. 
This had a negative effect on the product quality and product rangę. 
The rather politically motivated “quantity drive” led to inner insecu- 
rity in leaders (e.g. managers, branch directors) due to a conflict of 
motives: on the one hand the political task of a leader was to raise out- 
put, while on the other he had an interest in underreporting actual 
output (see plan bargaining) and an increase in costs or a fali in qual- 
ity could get him into trouble one or the other day. Furthermore, the 
“politicization” of the economic management process (rather than 
making decisions based on economic or technical arguments) often 
contributed “to a distortion of information over and above the distor­
tions” [North, 1990, p. 127] described above.
- The planning process itself leads to a huge information problem, 
which increases when the amount of transactions to be planned in- 
creases. The assembling and processing of the incredible amount of in­
formation and the co-ordination decisions based on this information 
are too difficult a task for one central body. The Iow level of computeri- 
sation of STEs led to a bigger problem of dealing with the information. 
While the development of information technology was slower than in 
WTEs, STEs needed it morę for information processing and solving 
the allocation problem. The mathematical problems had to be solved 
by trial-and-error, while there was a lack of time for working out the 
plan. This trial-and-error process and lack of time led to a plan fuli of 
inconsistencies, which revealed themselves during implementation. 
Modifying the plan was a cumbersome process, because a change in 
one part caused a change in other parts. Furthermore, the difficulties 
with changing the plan also delayed the introduction of innovation,
TRANSACTION COSTS UNDER PLAN, MARKET, AND TRANSITION 145
making the system rigid and adaptively inefficient. Simplification of 
the task is a way to circumvent the huge transaction costs of fuli plan- 
ning by emphasising, for example, main tasks in order of importance. 
But this can leave holes in the plan, distorting resource allocation and 
giving incentives for opportunistic behaviour. The bureaucracy rather 
did not like this, and could introduce new regulations (rather than fix- 
ing the holes). Calls for simpler planning were counteracted by the 
tendency to be “complete, comprehensive, and watertight” [North, 
1990, p. 129], leading to a further increase in bureaucracy. To sum up, 
an increasing amount of transactions called for morę planning vari- 
ables to be determined, which, when simpler methods were applied, 
left morę loopholes. The tendency of the bureaucracy to control every- 
thing led to its growth, which went together with managerial dis- 
economies of scalę.
4.2. Problems of planning: morał hazard, 
knowledge and narrow interest
As discussed in Section 3, North connected the technical and social 
set-up of production in a vision on the cause of the wealth of nations. 
Some countries can have relatively Iow transaction costs, but a lack of 
incentives for dynamical efficiency (e.g. in the case of state monopolies). 
Other countries can have strong incentives for technical efficiency, but 
face high transaction costs (e.g. the “Asian way”). The ąuestion of techni­
cal feasibility of planning is not the main problem, although it involves 
diseconomies of scalę. Morę important problems concern morał hazard 
and knowledge. Furthermore, the shift from ‘encompassing interest’ to 
‘narrow interest’ is important for explaining why the STE with its inher- 
ent problems experienced a period of fast economic growth.
As discussed above, a problem is that the system of central planning as 
in the STE is a system of directives creating morał hazard problems. It is 
impossible to give perfect directives, therefore individuals basically can do 
what they want. The idea is simple: a command or contract can never be 
complete (due to high transaction costs connected with “the presence of 
private information and/or unobservability of behaviour” [Molho, 1997, 
p. 12]), and the morę it is aimed at completeness, the morę the possibili- 
ties for control decrease, raising the possibilities for opportunistic behav- 
iour leading to high transaction costs that cause efficiency losses.15 Even 
in the theoretical case of non-existence of private information and the
15 A good example is a tax declaration form. The morę items that have to be reported, 
the morę difficult (costly) it is to control the truth of the reported items.
10— Economic...
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observability of all behaviour (no opportunistic behaviour) transaction 
costs still exists due to, for example, the complexity of the co-ordination 
problem and human fallibility (e.g. if there is a possibility of making 
a mistake, it can be necessary to control). However, in this case the co-or­
dination problem becomes rather a technical matter and the transaction 
costs are much lower than in case of opportunistic behaviour.
Increasing costs of transaction connected with the organisation of 
a centrally planned economy are connected with the Leninist principle 
‘trust is good, control is better’. In the situation at the beginning of this 
century in Russia, where the communist party operated underground, 
this principle was understandable. In the long term, however, this prin­
ciple is disastrous for an organisation. It can be said that Stalin carried 
this principle through into the extreme. The moment that controlling the 
fellow human being becomes an important element of the economic sys­
tem (or organisation), control costs increase (monitoring, enforcement), 
and the incentive to manipulate Information from below becomes bigger, 
which causes the information costs for the planner to increase. On the 
other hand, information provision and Processing was in fact monopo- 
lised by the planner. As a consequence, also on the lower levels morę of- 
ten decisions will be taken based on wrong/incomplete/manipulated in­
formation. Competition in the field of prooision and distribution of 
information (freedom of speech, etc.) can lead to ‘better information’. 
Morę trust leads to a smaller necessity of control (complete control is im- 
possible due to high control costs). Because of technological development 
(cameras, telecommunication, etc.) control becomes relatively easier (for 
example by phoning someone and checking where he/she is or what 
someone else is doing), but this can lead to a larger extent of opportunis­
tic behaviour. In other words, the moment that the government loses the 
trust of the population, it will be morę difficult to implement a policy be­
cause the lower levels have incentives to manipulate information and to 
show opportunistic behaviour.
Another problem of central planning is based on an idea of Hayek.16 
Even if the planner knows all production techniques (which is not very 
likely), still it is impossible for him to estimate the preferences of indi- 
viduals. Hayek’s point is that it is not the information problem (the diffi- 
culty of the planner to obtain the relevant information) but the knowl- 
edge problem that is crucial. This is connected with the fact that in order 
to increase their welfare individuals have to appropriate it privately. 
Preferences of individuals only take a definite shape when they start
16This argument is based on Kornai’s [1992, pp. 129 and 476] discussion of Friedrich 
Hayek’s (ed.) Collectwist Economic Planning (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1935).
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searching a product. To make the idea intuitively elear: would you be in- 
terested in all the details of a car that you cannot afford yourself? Proba- 
bly not. Only by the time you have the money available you start looking 
what types of cars there are, and you might not like the car produced ac- 
cording to the plan. Hayek’s knowledge problem is at least double-sided. 
The planner needs to have the knowledge which consumers of those 
products often do not have themselves. The planner cannot look into the 
futurę, so he cannot start with product innovations. The only solution for 
this is according to Hayek trial-and-error, something a planner cannot 
do, but a market can.
Using an argument from Olson [1992, p. 56], it can be said that in the 
USSR the transaction costs inereased after the death of Stalin. He argues 
that Stalin as a ‘dictator’ and de facto the owner of the USSR had a ‘en- 
compassing interest’ which furthered economic growth. After his death 
there was a shift from ‘encompassing interest’ to ‘narrow interest’,17 lead- 
ing to higher transaction costs. The power that in the beginning was 
largely in the hands of the ‘dictator’ “was diffused throughout a “new 
class” of apparatchiks (bureaucracy), and sometimes even to groups of 
workers in individual establishments.” [Olson, 1992, p. 58] This led to an 
inereasing principal-agent problem and an inereased struggle for the dis- 
tribution of welfare which caused the bureaucracy to spend morę effort on 
this, rather than on producing efficiently. This argument can also be used 
for Poland until Bierut’s death in 1956,18 although it is much less strong. 
In other words, when the classical socialist system was established, there 
had already been a transformation towards narrow interest.
17 “If an individual, or an organisation with enough coherence and discipline to act with 
rational self-interest, obtains a substantial proportion of any inerease in the output of a 
society and bears a large proportion of any drop in this social output, then this individual 
or organisation has an encompassing interest in that society. This encompassing interest 
gives the actor in ąuestion an incentive to care about the productivity of the society and to 
attempt to inerease it. In other words, the encompassing actor’s interests are not only 
served by obtaining a larger share of the social output, but also by inereasing the output 
of the society. By contrast, an individual or organisation with a “narrow” interest — one 
that receives only a miniscule share of any decrease of the society’s output - will have no 
incentive to try to inerease social output. That individual or organisation has only an in- 
centive to strive to obtain a larger share of the society’s output through distributional 
struggle, even if this distributional struggle reduces the national income by much morę 
than the narrow interest obtains.” [Olson, 1992, pp. 55-6]
18“Despite the affection of monolithic solidarity, the Polish communist movement dif- 
fered from the Soviets on many essential issues, and was deeply divided within itself... In 
the end, when Stalin was left ruling Poland through his reserve team of faceless puppets, 
it was as much a failure for him, as for the Polish communists themselves.” [Davies, 1981, 
p. 576]
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5. Transaction costs in STEs and WTEs: a comparison
In this section it is attempted to compare transaction costs in STEs 
and WTEs. Although the market mechanism fails on several points 
(which is an argument for the case of planning), one of its strengths is 
the price mechanism that lowers transaction costs. The diagram below 
illustrates the increasing transaction costs in a growing economy and 
the typically higher transaction costs in an STE (due to the inherent in- 
flexibility and adaptive inefficiency) compared to a WTE.19 The MPC 
(marginal production costs) curve has a negative slope due to increasing 
economies of scalę. The MTC (marginal transaction costs) curve has 
a positive slope because with increasing production morę complex trans- 
actions take place leading to diseconomies of scalę.20 First the MC (mar­
ginal costs = MPC + MTC) curve shows a declining trend. However, at 
a certain moment exchange becomes too complex, and the increasing re- 
turns to scalę are morę than compensated by the increasing transaction 
costs. While the economy was growing, institutional change took place in 
WTEs, causing the MTC to shift to the right to MTC’ and MC to shift 
downwards to MC’. As a conseąuence the output increased from Q to Q’. 
STEs did not show such an adaptive efficiency, causing the marginal 
transaction costs to increase which resulted in lower output and fewer 
possibilities to take advantage of economies of scalę in the production 
process compared with WTEs.
19Transaction costs are partially measurable [see Wallis and North, 1986] because 
they go through markets and partly difficult to measure. Time spent on ąueuing and the 
annoyance going together with this in Poland before 1990 can be indicated, but measure- 
ment remains very imprecise. For example, of 396 Poles who reported to have ąueued be­
fore 1989, 61.1% assessed it as being very annoying, 28.8% as annoying, while only 1 per­
son reported it to be pleasant and 1 assessed it as being very pleasant. [Platje, 2000]
20 It is argued here that transaction costs show decreasing economies to scalę. However, 
it can also be argued that there are first economies of scalę, and after a certain moment dis­
economies of scalę set in. In other words, institutions can be suitable for a certain produc­
tion- and allocation structure. However, on a certain moment a limit is reached where the 
rules of the gamę that first stimulated the making of transactions now hamper the process. 
This can be legał rules that do not take into account new technological developments, insti­
tutional arrangements that do not suit the new developments, and so on. There comes morę 
friction in the system, making institutional change necessary. If this does not happen, 
transaction costs can become that high that economic stagnation will take place.
Neal and Barbezat [1998, p. 56] argue that “the primary factor in the 
growth of European production and trade has been technological prog- 
ress, which has created new goods not even imagined in 1958, reduced 
the cost of producing other goods that were available in the United 
States but not yet in Europę, and reduced the business transaction costs,
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including the shipping charges, and costs of inventory control and mar­
keting.” Economic integration and an increase in International trade 
were important factors stimulating economies of scalę due to specialisa- 
tion and the spread of innovations through WTEs. So while due to the 
integration process in Europę the (marginal) market transaction costs 
declined (shift to right), in STEs planning transaction costs increased 
due to ‘failed’ reforms, an increased planning problem, and an increased 
principal-agent problem. Although there were economies of scalę in 
STEs, innovation, integration, specialisation (trade), etc. stayed behind.
In the beginning the institutions of the STE were effective for fast de- 
velopment of the productive forces, and because the scalę of production 
did not cause many complexities, increasing economies of scalę could be 
obtained.21 The institutional structure and the property rights order 
brought the ‘structural production possibility frontier’ (the set of possible 
organisations that shape the structure of property rights to minimise 
costs and maximise output) close to the ‘technical production possibility 
frontier’ (the stock of knowledge and endowments that determine the up- 
per limits of productivity and output) and caused the last one to expand.
21 Planning can be ąuite effective to generate investment and fast growth in key sectors 
(e.g. heavy industry) that are the basis of further economic development. For example in 
Western Europę just after World War II, where the market had a bad name and market 
institutions were not well developed, government planning and intervention had a large 
impact. “There was no functioning private sector to which to turn in order to mobilize the 
investment, capital goods, and skills necessary for reconstruction and recovery; interna- 
tional trade and payments had been disrupted. Governments would have to fili the vac- 
uum and take charge. They would be the organizers and champions of recovery. There 
was nothing else.” [Yergin and Stanisław, 1998, p. 21].
150 JOOST PLATJE
However, a conseąuence of the increasing scalę of production and 
morę advanced technology was that exchange became morę complex. 
The transaction costs of using the technology increased. The ‘technologi- 
cal gap’ to the Western market economies became bigger. Western mar­
ket economies innovated in a technological sense, which went together 
with institutional change of which the distribution sector is a good ex- 
ample. In other words, the institutional environment in WTEs stimu- 
lated technological development, making institutional change necessary. 
Technological change took place to a lesser extent in STEs, and neces­
sary institutional change happened in the form of reforms. However, 
system inherent factors hampered reforms (according to, among others, 
Lavigne [1999] the power monopoly of the communist party was the 
most important obstacle), which resulted in increasing transaction 
costs.22 A conseąuence of the shortage economy was the growth of the 
parallel economy, which undermined the effectiveness of planning and 
caused the transaction costs in the distribution sector to increase.23 The 
institutional environment was market-unfriendly. Although the USSR 
did a lot in, for example, the military field, there were huge barriers for 
applying new technology in the consumption sector.
22Pejovich [1995] argues that the planner in fact has an interest in keeping shortages. 
If the shortages would disappear, and the co-ordination mechanism would work without 
many problems, the planner loses its distribution function (the distribution function gives 
him economic power). An implication for transformation is that the bureaucrat (planner) 
loses economic power, and in order to facilitate institutional change the bureaucrat can be 
given an interest in the new system, which could have happened under the old system 
when many of them already took care of starting their own business.
23 Paradoxically, the informal economy was on the one hand a ‘lubricant’ of the planned 
economy, stepping in where there were planning failures, while, on the other hand, it un­
dermined the system of central planning. Although the institutional environment was 
hostile with respect to markets (in most of the cases markets were illegal) and there was 
a lack of institutions that facilitated market transactions (no legał system to enforce mar­
ket contracts), trade existed because of substantial gains from trade and the fact that 
some forms of trade, in particular trade “that can be consumed on the spot”, were self-en- 
forcing because the interest of the parties involved was big enough to let transactions 
take place, despite high transaction costs. [Olson, 1992, p. 62].
Changing the rules of the gamę (with the structure of property rights 
as the most important one) was necessary to let the ‘structural produc­
tion possibility frontier’ and the ‘technical production possibility frontier’ 
expand simultaneously and to lower transaction costs. The co-ordination 
problem of eąuilibrating demand and supply increased. In Poland, short- 
ages intensified at the end of the 1970s, becoming a bigger problem in 
the 1980s, being very intensive in 1981, and staying at least until 1987 
far above the level of the 1970s. [Hockuba, 1995, p. 30] This influenced
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the incentive structure negatively: too little innovation (due to the struc- 
ture of property rights), declining labour morale, and increasing control 
costs (army, police, the bureaucratic apparatus). In reality, institutional 
change was only possible within the constraints of the power monopoly 
of the communist party, the influence of the Sowiet Union, and the lim- 
ited possibilities to change for example the property rights order (e.g. on 
ideological grounds).24
24 Eggertsson [1990, p. 61] argues that the communist party was conscious of the fact 
that a change in the structure of property rights would lead to an increase in the net out- 
put, but the ‘agency problem’ was a hampering factor. Most of the reform proposals con- 
sidered decentralisation of economic power, which means morę power for agents of the 
State. There was a fear for increasing ‘agency costs’ (control costs of monitoring agents) 
and a loss of control. Because of the self-interest of the ruling elite the inefficient system 
of property rights stayed and a morę advanced system of rules was not introduced. High 
transaction costs caused failure of output-increasing reforms.
25Extensive growth means increasing output by using morę inputs, while intensive 
growth means increasing output by a morę efficient use of inputs.
Following Eggertsson [1990], an STE like Poland in the 1960s still 
had resources for extensive growth25 (many natural resources were 
available in the USSR), in 1970s the problems were attempted to be 
solved via import-led growth based on importing Western technology 
and in the case of Poland acąuiring Western credits and loans. The in- 
ternal problems in the Polish STE had accumulated so much by the end 
of the 1970s, that reform was necessary. Important reasons for this were 
economic problems caused to a large extent by high transaction costs 
and public dissatisfaction due to economic and non-economic reasons. 
The recession at the end of the 1970s was to a certain extent the result 
of the huge foreign debts and the fact that, for example, production un- 
der licence of foreign companies did not lead to extra export of the goods 
produced (while costs were madę). The agreement with Fiat to produce 
under licence led only in a later stage to the production of cars that could 
be exported, but by that time the model was already out of fashion in the 
West. High transaction costs can be an answer to the question why there 
was such a long interwal of time between the acąuirement of the licence 
and the factual production.
Reforms in the 1980s changed the system on the surface, but the prob­
lems still existed [Balcerowicz, 1997]. De facto planning was largely re- 
placed by state purchases, but many features remained (lack of competi- 
tion between suppliers, plan bargaining, shortages, etc.). Poland left the 
path of central planning without introducing a market mechanism 
[Balcerowicz, 1997, p. 350], which created the pre-conditions for falling 
apart of the system. In a situation of reforming a centrally planned econ-
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omy without introducing a market mechanism (private enterprise was al- 
lowed, but there were many mechanisms giving disincentives to under- 
take economic activities), where no elear new co-ordination mechanisms 
come into place while many old mechanisms keep on existing, transaction 
costs rather inerease. Martial law from 13 December 1981 inereased the 
dissatisfaction among the population, while many people left the Commu- 
nist Party,26 a sign that at least the lower cadres did not believe so much 
anymore in the case of the centrally planned economy. Public support 
and belief in the case of socialism created ‘internal incentives’. When 
this acceptation/ideology withered away, ‘external incentives’ had to be 
given by reshaping the institutions inereasing the transaction costs. Fur- 
thermore, the use of rules of the gamę is a “knowledge-creating process”. 
[Pejovich, 1995, p. 91] This means that when a system establishes itself, 
people find holes and weaknesses in the system, and make use of this 
knowledge. This “institutionalisation of opportunistic behaviour” became 
a bigger problem when the belief in the system (by the leaders and the 
common civilians) withered away due to reasons mentioned above and 
the example of WTEs showing a better performance than STEs.
26The membership of the Polish United Workers Party (PZPR) was at the end of 1980 
3,091,900, at the end of 1981 2,690.600, at the end of 1983 2,185,700. [Taras, 1986, p. 38],
27“...property is not the only sphere of phenomena in which the classical system is un- 
able to cohabit lastingly with institutions, customs, attitudes, and norms alien to it. The 
maturę classical system cannot tolerate contrary political opinions, self-governing institu­
tions, and organisations independent of the political institutions organized from above; 
cultures and world views other than the official ones; or free-market exchange between 
autonomous economic entities. Ali these phenomena, though they may recur time after 
time, are confined into an ever narrowing area. Individual behaviour is deeply imbued 
with conformism: spontaneous use of the ideas and working abilities deriving from 
a spirit of enterprise is virtually ruled out, as are independent critical opinions and rebel- 
lion against superior organisations.” [Kornai, 1992, p. 367],
So due to growth of the economy the amount of transactions inereased, 
making the co-ordination problem bigger (inereasing transaction costs). 
Institutional change was necessary for lowering transaction costs, but 
due to the Iow adaptive efficiency this did not happen. Although the sys­
tem was able to survive for some time, the inereased transaction costs 
added up to other contradictions within the system (e.g. social and politi- 
cal factors), creating the basis for a revolutionary change (a change in 
the qualitative features of the system).
To conclude this section, Kornai [1992, p. 377] argues that the social- 
ist system was not capable “of a renewal that could free its dysfunctional 
features while retaining the sole rule of the Communist Party and the 
dominance of the state sector.”27 The internal strength of the system
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was the internal weakness at the same time. [Komai, 1992, p. 383] In 
other words, the system was not robust. A system is robust when 
changes in one or the other part constituting the system do not nega- 
tively affect the working of the system itself. The bigger such changes 
can be, the morę robust the system. Parameters of the components can 
change within a relatively large margin, while the influence on the sys­
tem as a whole stays smali. Robustness is relative: a system can be ro­
bust to a change in one component, but not for a change in another com- 
ponent. The socialist system was not robust, but rigid. It looked like 
a solid building in which there is no flexibility for movement. An inci- 
dent or change in a smali part works through the whole building, which 
because of that essentially changes and often collapses.
6. Increasing transaction costs versus incentives
at the beginning of the transformation
It seems quite obvious that when an economic system transforms to- 
wards another co-ordination mechanism, initially transaction costs in- 
crease due to the investment in ‘fixed’ transaction costs, disappearing 
networks and allocation mechanisms that are not directly replaced by 
new ones, a slowly changing mentality, etc. It can be argued that at the 
beginning of the transformation from a planned economy to a mar- 
ket-oriented economy, besides other factors like the introduction of 
a ‘hard budget constraint’ for many companies, high market transaction 
costs were an important factor causing economic stagnation.
The question is to what extent transaction costs in the Polish economy 
increased as a result of the transition and to what extent the system 
change gave incentives for economic activity (and for whom). The costs of 
using the market (market transaction costs) were high due to the lack of 
an ‘institutional infrastructure’ that went together with changes in the 
institutional environment (laws, rules, property rights, etc.) and changes 
of institutional arrangements (privatisation, administrative reforms, 
etc.), while for example consumer preferences at the beginning of the 
transformation were quite unstable. A question is which advantages and 
disadvantages the lack of elear rules brought about at the beginning of 
the transformation. Furthermore, there was a large value in the public 
domain because property rights were not clearly defined at the begin­
ning of the transformation. The struggle for obtaining the property 
rights can lead to an inefficient property rights order. Although the fair- 
ness can be disputed, it can be argued that the partly ‘spontaneous 
privatisation’ which already started before 1990 in Poland and the later
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legalised take-over of state-owned enterprises by ‘insiders’ is an impor- 
tant factor in the establishment of (relatively) efficient institutions, be- 
cause it, among others gave part of the bureaucrats under the old sys­
tem an interest in the new system.
The transformation at the beginning of the 90s was accompanied by 
a recession, but in 1993 the economy started to grow again. The path of 
growth in Poland was L-shaped when the GDP-index and the index of 
Gross Industrial Output are taken into consideration (i.e. a sharp decline 
in GDP at the beginning followed by a longer series of annual growth 
rates of 5-6%). Interesting is the ‘systemie explanation’ given by 
Blanchard28 for the U-shaped GDP-index in former planned economies (in 
fact, the Polish L-shape was a morę extreme variant of Blanchard’s 
U-shape). The most important cause is ‘disorganization’. The links be- 
tween the centrally planned entities were not immediately replaced by 
market operations, which was accompanied by the impact of price 
liberalisation, the elimination of subsidies and the replacement of ‘soft 
budget constraints’ by ‘hard budget constraints’. In other words, the insti- 
tutional environment changed, as a result of which the institutional ar- 
rangement became less useful, but market institutions were not devel- 
oped enough at the beginning of the 1990s. High transaction costs (mainly 
search and negotiation costs, although the opportunistic behaviour of ad- 
venturers who wanted quick profit must not be underestimated) followed 
and less economic activity took place than would be the case under (morę) 
developed market institutions and planning.
28Blanchard, Oliver, The Economies of Post-Communist Transition, Clarendon Press, 
Oxford, 1997; also mentioned in Lavigne [1999, pp. 157-8].
Blanchard [1997, pp. 17 and 31] explains this as follows. State-owned 
enterprises (SOE) obtained inputs from a single supplier. Although 
liberalisation can take place overnight, this is not the case for the situa- 
tion with respect to the number of suppliers. The difference is that under 
market circumstances suppliers have other private market opportunities 
about which the buyer has no knowledge. There were numerous ‘bar- 
gaining failures’, and the production in the state sector collapsed.
Johnson and Loveman [1995] argue that besides this fali in output 
due to, among other things, inereased transaction costs for large 
state-owned enterprises and the surviving technical inefficiency at the 
beginning of the transformation, much of the economic renewal was 
caused by the start-up of new companies. At the beginning relatively lit- 
tle Capital was needed to start a business while much of the growth in 
this sector was stimulated by retained earnings. At the end of the 80s it 
was relatively easy to start a business due to Iow barriers to entry. Ini-
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tial Capital needed was minimal because of the naturę of the business 
(smali scalę), and starting a ‘spółka z o.o.’ (a company with limited liabil- 
ity) was easy because trade law dated from before the second world war 
and the mentioned initial Capital had devaluated much due to inflation. 
Because of this the unreformed banking system did not really impede 
the growth of this sector, and when it started to reform its role became 
morę important.29 Johnson and Loveman argue that “large-scale organi- 
zational changes within well-endowed capitalist enterprises is exception- 
ally difficult, slow, and quite often unsuccessful. The large state enter­
prises of Central and Eastern Europę faced far morę difficult challenges 
with far fewer resources of all kinds.” On the other hand, they argue, 
private entrepreneurs had strong incentives for “starting over”30 created 
by the communist mismanagement of the economy “to such an extent 
that gradual economic liberalization gave rise to an almost unlimited 
number of markets in need of new and better products and services.” 
[Johnson and Loveman, 1995, p. 3] The institutional environment 
needed for this, macroeconomic stability and trade liberalisation, were 
achieved almost immediately by the Balcerowicz Plan in 1990.
29Jeffry Sachs in the foreword of Johnson and Loveman [1995, p. xii],
30‘Starting over’ is “the creation of a new business with new organizational forms and 
work practices that are free from the accumulated baggage of the communist period.” 
[Johnson and Loveman, 1995, p. 5],
In generał, smali and medium enterprises in the private sector can 
adapt faster to new circumstances than (especially big) SOEs. SOEs 
faced disappearing channels for buying and selling, which resulted in 
high search and negotiation costs. The internal oganisation did not 
change so fast, and privatisation proceeded slowly. Besides the huge 
amount of markets to be served, an institutional vacuum (e.g. laws) cre­
ated a lot of opportunities for starting a smali business. Smali enter­
prises simply employ less people, which makes them morę flexible. But 
also the problem of co-operation is of importance. This was expressed 
strongly by an entrepreneur who said that it is better to be the only 
owner of a firm than to have a partnership, because a partnership only 
leads to fights about who is allowed to take decisions. A question for fur- 
ther research is to what extent such a business can survive in an envi- 
ronment of increasing competition. Big SOEs in the same sector needed 
morę time in order to restructure, and would probably only later benefit 
from returns to scalę of using the market. In other words, how do the in- 
centives develop for aiming for an efficient set-up of companies, espe­
cially the large slow-reforming (privatised) SOEs. Is the institutional en- 
vironment set up in such a way that the transaction costs are lowered
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and there is an incentive for institutions to lower transaction costs fur- 
ther? These two are important conditions for further economic growth.
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